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Appellees Texaco and Getty respectfully submit this reply
to

Appellant's

Answer

to

Appellees'

Petition

for

Rehearing

(hereafter "Appellants' Answer" or "Answer").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In their Petition for Rehearing, Appellees specifically
identified the errors in the Court's decision that need to be
reconsidered. Gold Standard attempts to characterize these issues
as "tangential" and "irrelevant," but a review of the opinion,
together with Getty's Petition, makes it evident that the issues
raised by Getty go to the heart of the Court's opinion.
Contrary to Gold Standard's assertion, Getty does not
argue that work product should apply to all documents created after
a party anticipates litigation.

That is not at issue here. What

is at issue is the Court's holding that Getty did not anticipate
litigation at the time it created the Kundert Memorandum, despite
the contrary evidence presented to and accepted by the trial court.
However, by treating anticipation of litigation as a pure legal
issue, instead of the factual question that it is, the Court
created a rule that will make it virtually impossible to protect
any pre-litigation investigation conducted by a prudent party who
reasonably and correctly anticipates litigation.

This Court

ignored and misstated the evidence that the sole reason Getty
created

the Kundert and Mintz memoranda was Gold

Standard's

threats. This Court should reconsider its ruling that the Kundert
and Mintz memoranda were not created in anticipation of litigation.
Second, the facts do not support the legal conclusion
that Getty waived its privilege.
factual question.

Waiver is also an inherently

There is a strong presumption against finding
Page 1

of waiver, and this Court should grant considerable deference to
the trial court's determination that Getty did not waive its
rights. The factual record supports the trial court's finding that
Getty did not waive work product protection.

Richard Klatt, the

person that Gold Standard claims saw Kundert's memorandum while
employed at Getty signed a confidentiality agreement with Getty
prior to the time he saw the document. Later, after litigation had
commenced, Getty's trial counsel sought return of the documents as
soon as it discovered that it was operating under a mistake of fact
and was able to investigate the actual facts.

The trial court

considered the facts and circumstances set forth in the record in
ruling that no waiver occurred. This Court should uphold the trial
court's ruling on waiver.

At a minimum, this Court should remand

the matter to the trial court if it determines that the trial court
applied an incorrect legal standard.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Court Should Reconsider the Standard of
Review Applied in This Case.
In its Answer, Gold Standard completely ignores prior

rulings by this Court and argues that the Court should not pay any
deference to the trial court's decision granting Texaco's and
Getty's Motion for Protective Order.

To review the trial court's

decision, and hence every other discovery issue that is appealed,
de novo would seriously burden the Court, impair its ability to
handle its caseload and weaken trial courts' ability to manage
effectively the cases assigned to them.
In Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310,
495 P.2d

1255 (1972), this Court expressly stated that "wide

latitude of discretion is necessarily vested in the trial judge"

in ruling on production of potentially privileged documents. That
same standard and realization must be applied here.
This Court and the Court of Appeals have repeatedly
stated

that

rulings on case management

issues and pre-trial

discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court and
should be reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion. Gold
Standard seeks to impose on this Court and the Court of Appeals the
onerous task of undertaking a de novo review of all discovery
issues, regardless of whether there are issues of fact or whether
the parties stipulate to the facts.
Although Gold Standard now attempts to characterize
this

appeal

as an appeal

of pure

legal

issues,

it clearly

recognized in its opening brief to this Court that the trial
court's decision was principally factual:
The record on appeal in this case consists
of the memoranda submitted by the parties,
together with certain attachments to those
memoranda, including portions of deposition
transcripts and various affidavits.
The
memoranda contain numerous representations as
to the underlying facts that in part form the
factual backdrop necessary to understand and
resolve the motion.
The trial court
undoubtedly relied on these assertions.
Brief of Appellant Gold Standard, Inc. at 14 n.8 (August 28, 1989)
(emphasis added).
Precisely because the concept of "anticipation of
litigation4' is factual, it must be left to the trial court to
review the facts, evaluate the historical relationship between the
parties to a lawsuit, and determine whether or not particular
documents constitute work product.
In Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952) ,
this Court reviewed an appeal from an interlocutory discovery order

involving transcripts of interviews with witnesses to a railroad
accident. Although the trial court in Mower did not enter findings
of fact and there

is no indication

it ever considered live

testimony, this Court reviewed the order under the same standard
applied to general jury verdicts and concluded:
[I]n reviewing this decision we assume
that the trial court found the facts in accord
with its decision in all cases where under the
evidence it could reasonably so find.
Id. at 227.
Gold Standard's reliance on Diversified Equities, Inc.
v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), is misplaced and it reveals the error of Gold Standard's
argument.

The parties in Diversified Equities read stipulated

facts into the record regarding a quiet title issue. There being
no factual dispute, the trial court ruled only as a matter of law.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals similarly considered only the
legal issue.

In this case, the parties never stipulated to facts

before the trial court or on appeal.

A review of the statements

of fact presented by both parties in their opening briefs on appeal
highlights the existence and importance of factual issues in this
matter.
The trial court's determination that the memoranda are
entitled to work product protect should be affirmed. At a minimum,
the matter should be remanded to the trial court for further
consideration in light of this Court's decision.
II•

The Court Should Reconsider its Ruling that the
Kundert and Mintz Memoranda Were Not Prepared
in Anticipation of Litigation.
In its decision, this Court found that since Gold

Standard did not expressly threaten litigation in Scott Smith's

June, 1984 letter, Getty could not have anticipated litigation.
Gold Standard characterizes this factual finding as a matter of law
because that is the only way to support the Court's decision. Such
posturing is not supportable.
The only legal standard that could be adopted that
would support the factual conclusion set forth by this Court is
that a person must be expressly told they are going to be sued
before they can anticipate litigation.

This cannot be the test.

The most often cited and perhaps most succinct articulation of the
"anticipation of litigation1' test is that of Professors Wright and
Miller:
Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and
begin preparation prior to the time suit is
formally commenced. Thus the test should be
whether, in light of the nature of the document
and the factual situation in the particular
case, the document can fairly be said to have
been prepared or obtained because of the
prospect of litigation.
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure. § 2024, at
198 (1970) .

In light of the factual situation in this case, it

was certainly reasonable for the trial court to have concluded that
Getty

anticipated

litigation

after

receiving

McConnell's ten page accusatory letter.

attorney

Robert

Yet this Court did not

even mention that letter in its opinion.
For work product to have any meaning prior to the time
a lawsuit is actually filed, the legal standard must recognize that
a party may "anticipate" litigation before a potential opponent
expressly tells the party that he intends to sue.

Yet, this

Court's decision forecloses work product protection for nearly all
in-house investigations:

Page 5

In short, the Mintz and Kundert memoranda were
not written to "assist in pending or impending
litigation," Generally, a letter whose tone
is "threatening" but does not state an intent
to pursue litigation is insufficient to allow
a party to invoke work product protection to
protect an in-house report prompted by the
letter. Binks Mfg. Co.. 709 F.2d at 1120.
That rule applies here.
Smith's letter
addresses wrongs perceived by Gold Standard,
but it does not threaten litigation.
Slip op. at 9.
The work product doctrine will be seriously undermined
if a party cannot "anticipate litigation" until its potential
opponent has expressly stated that it intends to bring a lawsuit
without suggesting any possible alternative resolution.

Business

correspondence frequently ends on a positive or conciliatory note
and holds out some hope for a resolution short of legal action,
even if the bulk of the letter is very threatening and an intent
to sue is clear from the context in which the letter is written.2
A party receiving such a threatening letter may be reasonably
As discussed in Getty's Petition for Rehearing, the Binks
case is very different from the factual circumstances in this case.
See Petition for Rehearing at 8*9.
2

The standard set forth by this Court could enable persons,
by design, to get a cautious opposing company to do their
investigation for them. The person could accuse the company of
specific and actionable impropriety, but intentionally stop short
of directly threatening litigation, knowing that a prudent company
will recognize that litigation is probable and conduct an
investigation into the allegations. The accusing person could
later obtain a copy of any report that is created, even if company
management testifies that it created the report in anticipation of
litigation, since its potential opponent did not actually say that
he or she was going to sue. This scenario leads to the same
problem that Hickman v. Tavlor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), addressed and
attempted to eliminate. In Hickman, the Court was concerned that
an adversary, by design, might be able to take advantage of his
opponents' investigation and resulting written reports. The Court
noted that if such reports were "open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would ramain
unwritten." !£. at 511. The Court recognized that such a result
would lead to "inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices." id.

certain it is going to be sued, even if the letter stops short of
an express statement to that effect.
IIX

* The Waiver Issues Raised bv the Appellees in
Points III and IV of Their Petition Warrant a
Rehearing,
Gold Standard seeks to discredit Getty's arguments

regarding waiver of work product by branding Getty's reasoning as
"unprecedented." It is Gold Standard's own argument, however, that
is truly unprecedented.

Numerous courts, including Utah courts,

repeatedly have emphasized that a party can only waive a "known
right."J

On the other hand, Gold Standard has not cited a single

case in any context that applies the doctrine of waiver to a party
who was acting under a misapprehension of fact.
As

in

its

prior

briefs,

Gold

Standard

avoids

addressing the issues raised by Appellees by simply asserting that
the cases upon which appellees rely are "outside the area of
privilege,"

Appellant's

inapplicable.

Knowledge of the right itself is a foundational

prerequisite of all waiver.

Answer

at

8,

and

are

therefore

Privileged issues are not somehow

uniquely exempt from such a prerequisite.

See, e.g., Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d
573, 578 (Utah 1985); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah
1983); B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Serv., Inc.,
754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
4

Gold Standard argues that knowledge that Getty produced
the document, not knowledge of the privileged nature of document
itself, is the only relevant knowledge in determining waiver. That
asrgument is incorrect. It is knowledge of the existence of the
right itself that is an essential prerequisite to waiver. See
Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) ("'To constitute
a waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage,
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Blomouist. 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968))).
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Despite Gold Standard's attempts to characterize it as
such, this is not an "inadvertence" case.

Inadvertence concerns

the intent to relinquish a right, and has nothing to do with
knowledge

of the

existence

of the

right.

The question of

inadvertence presupposes that the party knows of its right, but
through carelessness or oversight fails to protect that right. In
this case, Getty had no predicate knowledge of its right to begin
with.

The Court should not rewrite the doctrine of waiver to

eliminate the element of a party's knowledge of the existence of
its right.
Furthermore, this Court should accord considerable
deference to the trial court in determining whether or not Getty
waived its right.

In Briaham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230

(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court stated:
Absent a showing that [plaintiff] unequivocally
intended to waive its right under the
provision, we will defer to the trial court
ruling.
Id. at 1233.

The record here fully supports the trial court's

ruling on waiver.
Finally, Gold Standard concedes that "a party that
does not realize that it has disclosed work product can retrieve
those documents [and obviously preserve work product protection]
if it acts diligently.4' Answer at 8.

5

Gold Standard then asserts,

Gold Standard contends that Getty did not act diligently by
claiming that "Getty was alerted to the fact that there may have
been attorney involvement in the creation of the Kundert Memoranda
at Mr. Kundert's December 1987 deposition," Answer at 13. This
representation is incorrect. Getty questioned Mr. Kundert as to
whether he worked with any attorney in preparing the memoranda and
Mr. Kundert stated that he had not. Opinion, p. 3. Nothing in Mr.
Kundert's deposition suggested that the document was created in
anticipation of litigation.
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however, that Getty's lack of knowledge regarding the work product
nature of the Kundert Memoranda is irrelevant.

Such argument

erroneously assumes, however, that a party can act "diligently",
or even act at all, in seeking to retrieve documents before the
party even knows or reasonably could know that the documents
contain work product.
Getty

set

forth

in

detail

in

its

Petition

the

burdensome and unreasonable obligation the Court's opinion places
on litigation counsel.

Gold Standard's over-simplistic response

is simply to ignore the facts and realities of this case and assert
that in most cases trial counsel will know which documents are
entitled to work product protection either because they will have
generated the documents themselves or because the work product
nature of a document will be evident on its face.
13.

Answer at 12-

However true Gold Standard's hypothesis may be for "most

cases/ it certainly is in error for this case and highlights the
factual nature of the waiver issues in this case and the importance
of leaving factual determinations to the trial court.
CONCLUSION
Gold Standard's arguments regarding the purpose for
which the Kundert and Mintz memoranda were created, maintenance of
confidentiality,

Getty's

knowledge

regarding

disclosure,

and

Getty's timing in seeking a protective order, all depend on the
factual record considered by the trial court. This Court erred in
its decision by not giving deference to the trial court and by
6

Gold Standard's assertion that "[i]f the adversary receives
the document and confidentiality is lost, there is a waiver,"
Answer at 9, contradicts its own concession that a party who
inadvertently discloses work product can retrieve those documents
if the party acts diligently.
Page 9

overlooking material facts and incorrectly setting forth other
facts that are critical to the issues decided by the trial court.
Appellees respectfully request that this Court reconsider its
September 21, 1990 decision in the this case in light of the issues
raised by Appellees in their Petition for Rehearing.
SUBMITTED this

H

GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER

^day of December, 1990.
KIMBALL
& GEE

WADDOUPS, BROWN

Stephen G. Crockett
Parrish
Brian J. Romriell
Mark F. James
Attorneys for Respondents Texaco Inc., Getty Oil Company and Getty
Mining Company

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of December,
1990, I caused four (4) copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S REPLY
TO APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING to be handdelivered to the following:
James S. Lowrie, Esq.
Christopher L. Burton, Esq.
George W. Pratt, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McdONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Building
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gordon L. Roberts, Esq.
Francis M. Wikstrom, Esq.
John B. Wilson, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Y\^4t^udJ^

Past

11

